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COMMENT
COLLATERAL CHALLENGES TO DEPORTATION ORDERS
UNITED STATES v. MENDOZA-LOPEZ
1. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,' the Supreme Court held that an
alien may collaterally attack his prior deportation order when it is to be
used to establish an element of the subsequent criminal offense of illegal
reentry into the United States.2 On October 23, 1984, Jose Mendoza-
Lopez and Angel Landeros Quinones ("Respondents") were arrested at
separate locations in Lincoln, Nebraska, by Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service Agents.3 On October 30, 1984, Respondents were transport-
ed to Denver, Colorado to attend their deportation hearing.4 Respon-
dents were part of a group deportation hearing, to be tried with eleven
other aliens.' The Immigration Law Judge (the "ILJ")6  advised
Respondents that each was entitled to representation by counsel.7 Both
acknowledged their understanding of this right but nevertheless refused
counsel.8
During the hearing, Respondents inquired about suspension of their
deportations, 9 apparently confused about the application of the eligibility
1. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
2. Id. at 841.
3. Id. at 830.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The ILJ is also known as a special inquiry officer. See Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, Justice, 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(0) (1989).
7. United States v. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, slip op. at 9 (D. Neb. Feb. 28,
1985).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 9-10. Suspension of deportation is a discretionary measure intended to
ameliorate hardship and injustice on certain deportable aliens who have fulfilled the
necessary requirements as outlined in the statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988), which
provides in part:
a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in
his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien
N.Y.L ScH. J. INTL & COMP. L[
requirements.10 The ILJ did not fully explain this relief," and Respon-
dents made no further inquiry regarding a suspension of their deporta-
tion. 2 Respondents were then ordered deported t3 When asked if they
would like to appeal this decision, Respondents declined. 4 The next
day, on October 31, 1984, the Order of Deportation was issued.U5 On
November 1, 1984, Respondents were taken to El Paso, Texas, where
they were deported.' 6
On December 12, 1984, Respondents were once again captured at
separate locations in Lincoln, Nebraska."7 A federal grand jury for the
district of Nebraska indicted Respondents on charges of unlawful reentry
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.18
... who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation
and -
(1) . . . has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately
preceding the date of such application, and proves that during
all of such period he was and is a person of good moral
character, and is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to
the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence....
10. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, at 10-11. Respondents did not request a
suspension of their deportations by that specific name, but instead asked for some type of
relief which would enable them to remain in the United States. Id. at 10.
11. Id. at 10-11. The ILJ was well aware that Respondents had met the statutory
requirements by having been physically present in the United States for over a seven-year
continuous period but nevertheless neglected to tell Respondents of their eligibility to apply.
Id.
12. Id.
13. 481 U.S. at 830.
14. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, at 10-11. A tape recording of the deportation
hearing indicated that Respondents were given only a few minutes to decide whether they
would like to appeal the decision. Id.
15. Id. at 2.
16. 481 U.S. at 830-31. At this time Respondents were each served with a copy of INS
Form 1-294, which advised them, both in English and Spanish, that an unauthorized return
to the United States following their deportations would constitute a felony. Id. at 830.
17. 481 U.S. at 830.
18. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1988), which provides in pertinent part:
... any alien who -
(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and
thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,
unless
(A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United
States or his application for admission from foreign
contiguous territory, the Attorney General has expressly
[Vol. 10
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At trial, Respondents moved to dismiss their indictments19 and sought
to suppress the evidence of their prior deportation order,2 claiming that
they were denied a fair deportation hearing."1 Respondents argued that
the I.J inadequately informed them of their right to counsel," causing
them to unintelligently waive that right.23 Respondents also contended
that the ILJ was remiss in his duty to adequately inform them of their
eligibility to apply for a suspension of their deportations.24 In opposition,
the United States Government argued that Respondents' motion
amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior deportation
order.2?
After the trial, Chief Judge Urbom of the United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed the indictments against
Respondents, 2 ' refusing to allow the deportation orders to stand as a
material element forming the basis of charges against them.? The Chief
Judge explained:
The defendants did not understand the consequences of the
choices that they were forced to make. Had they been fully
aware of such consequences, there is a substantial likelihood that
the result of the hearing would have been 'materially affected.'
consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or
(B) with respect to an alien previously excluded and deported,
unless such alien shall establish that he was not required
to obtain such advance consent under this chapter or any
prior act, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than
two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
Id
19. 481 U.S. at 831.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice, 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (1989), states that
the ILJ must "advise the respondent of his right to representation, at no expense to the
Government, by counsel of his own choice authorized to practice in the proceedings and
require him to state then and there whether he desires representation .. " This claim was
rejected by the district court. See United States v. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06,
slip op. at 9 (D. Neb. Feb. 28, 1985).
23. 481 U.S. at 831.
24. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice, 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1989), states
that the ILJ is required to "inform the respondent of his or her apparent eligibility to apply
for [suspension of deportation] and shall afford the respondent an opportunity to make
application therefor during the hearing."
25. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 781 F.2d 111, 112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert gfranted, 479
U.S. 811 (1986).
26. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, at 14.
27. Id.
1990]
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Therefore, the defendants demonstrated prejudice from the I.'s
failure to fully comply with the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 242.17.8
Displeased with this result, the government appealed, arguing that the
trial court erred in permitting Respondents to collaterally attack their
deportation orders,2 and that Respondents were nevertheless provided
with a fair deportation hearing.30
Judge Heaney, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, affirmed,31 quoting extensively from Chief Judge
Urbom's opinion in the district court below.32  Judge Fagg filed a
dissenting opinion in which he stated that the legislative history of
Section 132633 gave no indication that Congress was willing to allow a
defendant to question the validity of a prior deportation order in a
Section 1326 prosecution. 4 The United States Government once again
appealed, this time to the Supreme Court of the United States.35 The
government expressed its concern over the conflict that this issue has
raised among the various circuit courts36 in light of the many Section
1326 prosecutions it has occasion to bring.37 As a result, the Court
granted certiorari. 8
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, states the government's
position as follows: "The United States has asked this Court to assume
that respondent's deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair in
considering whether collateral attacks on the hearing may be permitted." 39
He defines the issue before the Court as "whether a federal court must
always accept as conclusive the fact of the deportation order [in a
subsequent criminal prosecution that utilizes that deportation order], even
28. Id.
29. 781 F.2d at 112.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 113.
32. Id.; see also United States v. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, slip op. at 14 (D.
Neb. Feb. 28, 1985).
33. See infra note 112.
34. 781 F.2d at 113.
35. See Petition for certiorari, Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 781
F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1985) (No. 85-2067).
36. Brief for Petitioner at 6.
37. During 1985 alone, United States attorneys authorized 1185 prosecutions under
Section 1326. Id. at 6 n.5.
38. 479 U.S. 811, 812 (1986).
39. 481 U.S. at 839-40. The government was not contesting the legality of the
deportation orders, but instead conceded that they were unlawful in asserting that
Respondents were nevertheless barred from collaterally challenging those determinations.
See also Brief for Petitioner supra note 35, at 7 n.6.
[V/ol. 10
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if the deportation proceeding was not conducted in conformity with due
process." 40
The Court agrees with the government's position that Congress did
not intend a deportation order to be collaterally attacked in a Section
1326 prosecution.41  Nevertheless, the Court takes a further step and
40. 481 U.S. 834 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1988), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) [T]he alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstan-
ces, of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and place
at which the proceedings will be held;
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense
to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such
proceedings, as he shall choose;
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence
against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the Government; and
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.
Therefore, in deportation proceedings, an alien who has illegally gained admission to this
country and has begun to develop the ties that accompany permanent residence has a right
to a fair hearing consistent with due procem. Marroquin-Manriquez v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982).
An alien has been denied a fair hearing when the grievance or action complained of
causes him to suffer some prejudice. See United States v. Calles-Pineda, 627 F.2d 976, 977
(9th Cir. 1980) (deportation hearing with twenty-nine aliens held fair); Nicholas v.Immigrati-
on & Naturalization Service, 590 F.2d 802, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusal of INS to send
alien copies of evidence to be used against him in deportation hearing not prejudicial when
it was shown that the material was readily available with little effort from another
convenient source). But cf Colindres-Aguilar v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 819
F.2d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1987) (failure of ILJ to inquire as to whether alien wished to
retain counsel held prejudicial error). A deportation proceeding is civil, however, not penal
in nature, and therefore constitutional rights guaranteed to an individual subject to a
criminal proceeding are inapplicable. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382,
1386 (10th Cir. 1981). See eg., Ramirez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 550 F.2d
560, 565 (9th Cir. 1977) (alien may knowingly waive right to counsel); United States v.
Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975) (alien not entitled to counsel at govern-
ment's expense); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (alien may be detained without
bail). But if a deportable alien were to be charged with a criminal offense, he would then
be entitled to full constitutional due process protection. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d
1386. As the Supreme Court stated long ago in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896):
[Regarding the Fifth and Sixth Amendments], it must be concluded that all
persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection
guaranteed by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to
answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or due property
without due process of law.
Id. at 238. For an excellent discussion of the Immigration Laws and how they comport with
due process, see Gordon, Due Process of Law in Immigration Proceedings, 50 A.B.A. J. 34
(1964).
41. 481 U.S. at 836.
19901
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assesses the constitutionality of the statute:
That Congress did not intend the validity of the deportation
order to be contestable in a Section 1326 prosecution does not
end our inquiry. If the statute envisions that a court may impose
a criminal penalty for reentry after any deportation, regardless
of how violative of the rights of the alien the deportation
proceeding may have been, such a statute does not comport with
the constitutional requirement of due process.42
The Court, therefore, concludes that there must be some sort of
meaningful review of a deportation proceeding when that determination
"is to play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal
sanction." 43 The Court further states that because of the procedural
defects in their deportation hearing, Respondents were completely
deprived of judicial review of that determination, and therefore "that
determination may not be used to enhance the penalty for an unlawful
entry under Section 1326." 44 The Court explains:
The immigration judge permitted waivers of the right to appeal
that were not the result of considered judgments by respondents,
and failed to advise respondents properly of their eligibility to
apply for suspension of deportation. Because the waivers of
their rights to appeal were not considered or intelligent,
respondents were deprived of judicial review of their deporta-
tion proceeding. The Government may not, therefore, rely on
those orders as reliable proof of an element of a criminal
offense.4e
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which he agrees
that collateral attack may be appropriate in some extreme circumstan-
ces.4 The Chief Justice states, however, that collateral review is
inappropriate in this situation47 because the ILJ had adequately complied
with the regulations 48 concerning the deportation hearing,49  and
42. Id. at 837 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 837-38.
44. Id. at 840.
45. Id.
46. 481 U.S. at 843 (Rehnquist, Ch. J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice, 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.16, 242.17
(1989).
49. 481 U.S. at 845.
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Respondents had not exhibited the requisite adverse prejudice 0 necessary
to justify a collateral review."1 The Chief Justice also states that
suspension of deportation is a privilege that is "provided only as a matter
of legislative grace and entrusted to the broad discretion of the Attorney
General. 52 He concludes that the ILU's failure to engage in an extensive
discussion with Respondents in informing them of their eligibility for
suspension of deportation in no way compares with those "procedural
defects this Court has previously identified as fundamentally unfair."
5 3
Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion wherein he concludes
that it was constitutionally permissible to punish Respondents for
violating Section 1326 because, notwithstanding the denial of their right
of immediate appeal, 4 they still were able later to appeal their deporta-
tion orders on the grounds that those orders were unlawful and that
Respondents' waivers were unlawfully secured.55
I. BACKGROUND
In United States v. Spector,5 ' the Court left open the issue of whether
the validity of a deportation order may be challenged in a subsequent
criminal proceeding that utilizes that prior deportation order as an
essential element of the offense. 7 In Spector, the appellee alien was
ordered deported in 1930 for advocating the forcible overthrow of the
government. 8 He was later charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 156(c), s9
which makes it a felony for any alien ordered deported to willfully fail
or refuse to make a timely and good faith application for travel
documents necessary for departure.60 Appellee challenged the con-
stitutionality of the statute,61 claiming that it was vague in not specifying
50. In order for an alien to invalidate his deportation order, he must show violation of
a regulation serving him a benefitted purpose has prejudiced his protected interest. See
United States v. Rangel-Gonzates, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1980); Nicholas v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 590 F.2d 802, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1979).
51. 481 U.S. at 845.
52. Id. at 844-45.
53. Id. (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)) (the use of a coerced confession
coupled with a biased presiding judge rendered the hearing presumptively prejudicial).
54. 481 U.S. at 849 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
57. Id. at 172-73.
58. Id. at 170.
59. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 890, repealed by Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279.
60. 343 U.S. at 170.
61. Id. at 171. Appellee made no challenge to the validity of his prior deportation order.
19901
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which documents were necessary, nor to which country he should make
application.62 In ruling that the statute was constitutional,6 the Court
declined to consider the issue of whether the deportation order itself may
be collaterally attacked because the appellee had not raised the issue in
his argument." Since Spector was decided, a number of circuit courts
have confronted this issue with conflicting results.6
For example, in United States v. Bowles," the Third Circuit held that
in a prosecution for illegal reentry under Section 1326, the prior
deportation order must be "according to law." 67 The Third Circuit did
not expressly define this term,6s but instead relied upon the earlier
Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Heikkinen,6 which also allowed a
defendant alien to collaterally challenge his deportation order.70  In
addition, the Third Circuit's examination of the legislative history of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act")71 gave no indication that the
language of Section 1326 did not require a lawful deportation.72 As a
result, the Third Circuit allowed the defendant to attack his initial
deportation order" on either a factual or legal basis.74
Id. at 172-73.
62. 343 U.S. at 172.
63. Id. at 171.
64. Id. at 172-73.
65. Three years after Spector was decided, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the validity of
the deportation order is a necessary ingredient for a subsequent criminal prosecution
utilizing that deportation as a material element of the criminal offense. See United States
v. Heikkinen, 221 F.2d 890-92 (7th Cir. 1955). Like Spector, an alien ordered deported had
not made timely application for necessary travel documents with which to leave the country.
As a result of Spector and Heikkinen, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 651
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988)), which provides for a comprehensive
system of judicial review for deportation proceedings. Section 1105a provides in pertinent
part: "[flf the validity of a deportation order has not been judicially determined, its validity
may be challenged in a criminal proceeding against the alien for violation of subsection (d)
or (e) of Section 1252 of this title only by separate motion for judicial review before trial.
... ." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(6). The Court made note of the fact that Section l105a, while it
covered those situations for failure to timely acquire travel documents (Section 1252), it was
nonetheless silent as to Section 1326 prosecutions.
66. 331 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1964).
67. Id. at 749.
68. The Third Circuit stated that a deportation order must be based both in fact and
law before it may be used in a subsequent Section 1326 prosecution. Id. at 750.
69. 221 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1955).
70. 331 F.2d at 750 n.14.
71. See infra note 112.
72. 331 F.2d at 750 n.14.
73. In Bowles, the defendant had been ordered deported several times from 1950
through 1952. His original deportation proceeding, in 1950, charged him with illegally
entering the country in 1943 from Canada. At that time, Bowles was an active member of
[Vol. 10
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In Pena-Cabinallas v. United States,75 the Ninth Circuit was first
presented with this question 6 and followed the Third Circuit's ruling as
espoused in Bowles,77 requiring a lawful deportation in a Section 1326
prosecution.78  In United States v. Gasca-Kraft,19 this position was
reaffirmed when the Ninth Circuit stated that "[a] material element of
the offense defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a lawful deportation."0 There
the Ninth Circuit, without comment, relied upon the Bowles, Pena-
Cabinallas and Heikkinen decisions as the basis for its holding.81
Likewise, in United States v. Rosal-Aguilar,12 the Seventh Circuit
allowed for a collateral challenge of a deportation order under a Section
1326 prosecution, requiring the government to "prove the underlying
deportation to have been based on a valid legal predicate and obtained
accordirig to law."u The court relied on the Third and Ninth Circuit
decisions, as well as on Heikkdnen,8 decided only three years after
Spector,8 which was the first decision to stress the validity of a prior
the United States Armed Forces, and claimed that he was returning from a three-day leave
spent in Canada to report back to camp in the United States. Id. at 746-48 n.11.
74. Id. at 740.
75. 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968).
76. Though, in Pena-Cabanillas, the Ninth Circuit was to decide this issue for the first
time, a Southern California district court had occasion to hear a similar case almost a
decade earlier. In United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp 619 (S.D. Cal. 1959), the
Court found the defendant guilty of illegal reentry into the United States in violation of
Section 1326, but acknowledged that a defendant in such a prosecution has the right to
collaterally challenge the prior deportation proceeding. Id. at 626.
77. 331 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1964).
78. 394 F.2d at 789.
79. 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 152 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763
F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1985) (alien charged with illegal reentry could collaterally challenge
validity of deportation); United States v. Guerra de Aquilera, 600 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1979)
(government must prove defendant was previously deported according to law); United
States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1978) (lawfulness of deportation is a
material element of offense and may be collaterally attacked); Mendez v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977) (deportation order may be collaterally
attacked when alien's departure was effected by government in contravention of due
process).
81. 522 F.2d at 152. The Gasca-Kraft court also relied upon United States v. Osuna-
Picos, 443 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1971), where a Section 1326 prosecution was overturned and
the original deportation order declared invalid, even though the defendant had fraudulently
gained admission to the United States, because he was the child of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. Id.
82. 652 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 723.
84. 221 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1955).
85. 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
19901
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deportation order in a subsequent criminal prosecution, utilizing the
deportation as a material element of the criminal offense 8" In contrast,
the Tenth Circuit, in Arriaga-Ramirez v. United States,", refused to allow
a collateral challenge to a deportation order, relying solely upon two
decisions88 handed down prior to the enactment of Section 1326.19
In United States v. Gonzalez-Parra,90 the Fifth Circuit was more
analytical in denying collateral review. That court reasoned that
Congress had intended to bar collateral challenges to deportation
proceedings in illegal reentry prosecutions; therefore, collateral attack
would not be permissible. 91  The court based its reasoning on the
comprehensive scheme of judicial review of deportation orders provided
by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, 92 and because Section 1326 was not mentioned
therein, such review was unavailable.93
In United States v. Pereira,94 the Second Circuit also denied a
defendant alien the right to collaterally attack his deportation order.95
In this case, however, the holding was limited to the facts,9 the Second
Circuit reserving judgment for a later time on the right of aliens to
collaterally attack their deportation orders when faced with different
circumstances. 97
86. 652 F.2d at 723.
87. 325 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1963).
88. United States cc reL Rubio v. Jordan, 190 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1951); United States
er reL Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1949). The Tenth Circuit's reliance on the
former case is misleading because there, even though the Court ultimately denied the
defendant a collateral challenge, the holding suggested that a collateral attack may be
permissible when there is a gross miscarriage of justice in the deportation proceeding. 190
F.2d at 575-76.
89. 325 F.2d at 859.
90. 438 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.), ccrt denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971).
91. Id. at 697.
92. For the relevant portion of 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988), see supra note 65.
93. 438 F.2d at 697; see also United States v. Cruz-Sepulveda, 656 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.
1981) (alien not allowed to attack original deportation order in subsequent prosecution for
illegal reentry).
94. 574 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978).
95. Id. at 106.
96. Id.
97. Id. The Court stated:
The uncontested facts before us establish that Pereira has displayed a continuing
and flagrant disregard of the immigration laws of the United States. He has
persisted in reentering the United States as a stowaway despite repeated
deportations and criminal sanctions. Under these circumstances, we do not
hesitate to affirm Pereira's conviction, without deciding whether, under other
circumstances a collateral attack on a deportation order may be permissible in
a Section 1326 proceeding.
Id But cf United States v. Bowles, 331 F.2d 742, 746-48 n.11 (3d Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 10
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That time came five years later in United States v. Petrella,98 when
the Second Circuit sided with the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in denying
collateral review of deportation orders." There the court utilized a
"plain meaning" approach in examining the language of Section 132610
and found nothing that expressly referred to the validity of a prior
deportation order.101  The court then followed the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in its examination of the statutory scheme,1°2 and again
concluded that Congress intended to bar collateral attacks in Section
1326 prosecutions."' The court also suggested that aliens already have
sufficient avenues of attack available to them in challenging their
deportation orders,1°4 and stressed a need to toughen up the deportation
process. 10
Finally, the Eighth Circuit indicated that collateral review may be
warranted under certain circumstances,'06 but until Mendoza-Lopez it had
never dealt directly with this issueY17 It was against this background that
98. 707 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 921 (1983).
99. Id. at 67.
100. For the relevant language of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988), see supra note 18.
101. 707 F.2d at 66. The reasoning used by the Petrelia court can be contrasted to that
utilized by the Bowles court in that in Petreila, the court began its analysis by searching for
language in Section 1326 that would indicate a deportation order may be challenged,
whereas in Bowles, the court began by looking for language that would indicate a
deportation order may not be challenged.
102. See United States v. Gonzalez-Parra, 438 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 402 U.S.
1010 (1971).
103. 707 F.2d at 66.
104. In Petreila, the court referred to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1988) as providing aliens with
three methods of challenging an adverse deportation order before departing the United
States:
First, he may obtain civil judicial review of the rulings of the Board of
Immigration Appeals in the federal courts of appeals if he petitions for review
within six months of the date of the deportation order.... Second, if he is in
custody pursuant to the deportation order, he is entitled to habeas corpus review.
... Third, in a criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(3) (willful failure to
depart) or under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (violation of supervisory regulations), the
defendant may obtain pretrial judicial review.
Id.
105. Id. at 66 n.3.
106. See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S.
1057 (1975) (defendant's guilty plea had waived his right to a trial and an opportunity to
contest the determination of his alienage, collateral review, in this circumstance, is
unwarranted).
107. See United States v. Cabrera-Quintero, 650 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1981) (defendant
mistakenly based post-conviction relief from prosecution for illegal reentry on 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1971); challenge to prior deportation order would be unavailable).
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the Supreme Court was asked to resolve this conflict.108
III. DISCUSSION
The Court begins its inquiry by focusing on Section 1326 itself to
determine if collateral challenges to deportation orders were in fact
warranted.109 The Court first looks to the language of Section 1326,110
finding nothing therein to indicate an intent on the part of Congress to
provide for collateral review."' The Court then examines the legislative
history,1 1 2 and likewise concludes that Congress had not intended that a
deportation order be subject to collateral attack under a Section 1326
prosecution.lU
The Court also refers to the earlier repealed sections of the Act
that dealt with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. §§ 137-7(b),11 4 138'1 and 180(a),11 6
108. 481 U.S. at 832-33; see also Brief for Petitioner supra note 35, at 6.
109. 481 U.S. at 834.
110. For the relevant portion of Section 1326, see supra note 18.
111. 481 U.S. at 835.
112. There was very little mention of Section 1326 prosecutions in the legislative
hearings and debates prior to the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. It was referred to in the House Report only as follows: "[C]riminal sanctions are
provided for entry of an alien at an improper time or place, for misrepresentation and
concealment of facts, for reenray of certain deported aliens, for aiding and assisting subversive
aliens to enter the United States, and for importation of aliens for immoral purposes." H.R.
REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1653, 1724 (emphasis added).
The Senate Report states that Section 1326 was an attempt to impose the same
penalty for illegal reentry "for all [those] persons who have been deported, regardless of the
reason therefor, [and was to] cover any and all deportations." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 655, 656 (1950). Neither reference addresses the propriety of challenging a
deportation order in a subsequent Section 1326 prosecution.
113. 481 U.S. at 836.
114. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012, repealed by Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(16), 66 Stat. 163, 279. This former section stated that any
alien reentering the United States after having been deported for subversive activity would
be guilty of a felony and subject to a term of imprisonment of up to five years. Id.
115. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 878, repealed by Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279. This former section barred
the reentry of those aliens who had been deported for prostitution or other immoral
activity, imposing a term of imprisonment of up to two years. Id.
116. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, 45 Stat. 1551, repealed by Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)( 30), 66 Stat. 163, 279. This former section was the
predecessor of Section 1326 and made it a felony for any alien to reenter the United States
after having been deported "in pursuance of law." Id. Compare this language with the
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988), supra note 18.
The Court concluded that because the "in pursuance of law'" language of former
Section 180(a) was omitted from Section 1326, Congress must not have intended for a
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as well as the case law in existence at the time of the enactment of
Section 1326, which seem to suggest that a deportation order may be
subject to collateral challenge in some circumstances. 117 The Court
reasons that if Congress had intended to allow for a collateral challenge
of a deportation order, it would have done so by relying upon the
available statutory and case law.118 In addition, the Court traces the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning as espoused in Gonzalez-Parra'1 9 by noting that Section
1326 is not listed as one of those "enumerated exceptions" of the Act
that provides for some form of judicial review." Therefore, based upon
all of the above factors, the Court readily concludes that challenges to
deportation orders in Section 1326 prosecutions were not intendedY21
The Court, however, suggests that the legislative intent of Section
1326 is academic if the statute does not comport with due process. M
The Court cites to its past decisions in order to establish that some sort
of meaningful review is necessary when an administrative determination
is to "play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal
sanction . . -." The Court relies on cases where criminal proceedings
were conducted based upon administrative decisions concerning the
regulation of beef prices during World War II,uA failure to report to an
armed forces induction,12 and an individual's military classification.'2
lawful deportation to be a prerequisite to an imposition of a criminal penalty for illegal
reentry. 481 U.S. at 836. But see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(g) (1970), which states:
For the purposes of this chapter any alien ordered deported (whether before or
after the enactment of this chapter) who has left the United States, shall be
considered to have been deported in pursuance of law, irrespective of the source
from which the expenses of his transportation were defrayed or to the place to
which he departed.
Id. But cf Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1977) (deportation declared invalid
where alien had not been given an opportunity to contact counsel before disembarking).
117. See United States er rel. Beck v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 221, 222 (7th Cir. 1953) (refusing
to decide whether an alien deported for being a prostitute may collaterally attack her
deportation proceeding); United States cr rel. Rubio v. Jordan, 190 F.2d 513, 575 (7th Cir.
1951) (no collateral attack unless there was a gross miscarriage of justice); United States
e rel. Steffner v. Carmichael, 183 F.2d 19, 20 (5th Cir. 1950) (no collateral attack of a prior
deportation order in a subsequent prosecution unless there was a gross miscarriage of
justice); Daskaloff v. Zurbrick, 103 F.2d 579, 580-81 (6th Cir. 1939) (alien deported as a
prostitute may not collaterally attack validity of prior deportation when there is evidence
upon which the order of deportation may reasonably have been predicated, and there is no
application of an erroneous rule of law).
118. 481 U.S. at 836.
119. 438 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971).
120. 481 U.S. at 837; see 8 U.S.C. 0 1105a (1988).
121. 481 U.S. at 837.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 837-38.
124. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
125. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
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In his dissent, Justice Scalia takes issue with the majority's position,
stating that the Court is reading those prior decisions too broadly in
allowing for collateral review of an administrative proceeding in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.l 7 In actuality, however, the majority
does not rule that all criminal prosecutions that result from an ad-
ministrative proceeding may not be used as a conclusive element of a
criminal offense where an opportunity for judicial review has been
effectively denied."' In so holding, the majority is willing to look to the
spirit of those earlier decisions in order to justify its position.
The majority also rejects the government's argument that Lewis v.
United States29 controls in barring collateral review to Respondents.M
In Lewis, the Court held that a convicted felon was not permitted to
attack the validity of a prior felony conviction under a subsequent
prosecution for violation of the since repealed Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,"3 which placed a restriction on a felon's
possession of firearms, even though the prior felony conviction may have
occurred without the benefit of counsel."2 The Court reasons that in
Lewis a prior felony conviction was not the sole justification for imposing
the restriction on firearms possession."' Instead, the statutory purpose
was to place a disability on those individuals who Congress felt presented
a threat to society. 134 For example, in addition to convicted felons,
individuals under indictment were also affected."' Therefore, under
Lewis, guilt in and of itself is not the determining factor in the imposi-
tion of the statutory sanction."' Deportation proceedings, however, are
126. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
127. 481 U.S. at 848-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 839 n.17.
129. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
130. 481 U.S. at 840.
131. Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 236-37, repealed by Act of
May 19, 1986, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459. This statute provided in relevant part:
Any person who... has been convicted by a court of the United States or of
a State or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony ... and who
receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce . .. any
firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
two years, or both.
Id.
132. 445 U.S. at 65-67.
133. 481 U.S. at 840; see Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) ("Congress
could rationally conclude that any felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a
sufficient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm.").
134. 445 U.S. at 67.
135. Id.
136. Id. Because a valid felony conviction was not necessary for the statute to impair
an individual's ability to possess firearms, the Lewis Court concluded that Gideon v.
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civil in natureu7 and, unlike the situation in Lewis, are not subject to
the same constitutional safeguards inherent in criminal prosecutions.3
The majority's conclusion that Lewis does not control is further
supported by the fact that in Lewis, collateral review of one's felony
conviction was always available to an individual, 139 whereas in this
particular civil deportation hearing, Respondents were denied direct
review of their deportation orders due to the LU's failure to adequately
explain to them the only relief for which they would have been efigible.14
Again, this position is contrary to Justice Scalia's statement that
"notwithstanding their waivers and the fact that they had been deported,
respondents could still have appealed their deportations on the ground
that they were unlawfully secured ... ."141 The Court does not expressly
deal with this issue, but implies that Respondents were denied all
avenues of appeal as a result of the procedural inadequacies of their
deportation hearing.142
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), did not apply. That case established the representation
of counsel as a necessary safeguard in any criminal proceeding. Id at 344; see also United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972) (a court may not consider constitutionally
invalid prior convictions in imposing sentence on a subsequent unrelated offense); Burgett
v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (conviction handed down without the representation of
counsel that either supports guilt or enhances punishment for a subsequent offense will not
be permitted). In Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), decided only three months after
Lewis, the Supreme Court limited Lewis to its facts and held that a court may not utilize
a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction collaterally to enhance a subsequent
misdemeanor into a felony by imposing an increased term of imprisonment. Id. at 228-
30. But see 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988), which provides in pertinent part:
Any alien who ... enters the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers .... shall for the first commission of... such
offensen, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof be punished
by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than
$500, or by both, and for a subsequent commission of any such offense[] shall be
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment
for not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
Id.
137. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1981).
138. See Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-
39 (1984). Although the name is similar, this case is in no way connected to Respondents'.
139. 481 U.S at 841.
140. Id. at 842.
141. Id. at 848-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. 481 U.S. at 838-41. The Court twice stated that Respondents were effectively
denied a right of appeal. Id. at 839 n.17. In acknowledging that there was a possible
procedural route open to Respondents, the Court pointed to the ILl's inadequate
supervision of the deportation hearing as the factor which in effect closed off this route of
appeal. The Court stated:
Because respondents were deprived of their rights to appeal, and of any basis to
appeal since the only relief for which they would have been eligible was not
adequately explained to them, the deportation proceeding in which these events
1990]
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Again, in focusing on the criminal sanctions to which Respondents
have been subjected, the Court justifies its willingness to conform the law
to meet fundamental fairness standards 1 3 by applying constitutional Due
Process safeguards in cases involving illegal reentry.1" In so doing, the
Court appears to have been influenced by Justice Jackson's dissenting
opinion in Spector45 wherein he stated:
Having thus dispensed with important constitutional safeguards
in obtaining an administrative adjudication that the alien is guilty
of conduct making them deportable on the ground that it is only
a civil proceeding, the Government seeks to turn around and use
the result as a conclusive determination of that fact in a criminal
proceeding. We think it cannot make use of such an order. It
must be remembered that the deportation proceeding is an
exercise of an adjudicative, not rule-making, power. The issue
on which evidence is heard is whether the alien has committed
acts which are grounds for deportation. The decision is whether
he is guilty of such past conduct, and if so, the legal result is
liability to deportation. This is not the type of administrative
proceeding which results in a rule or order prescribing rates or
otherwise guiding future conduct.1
The Court also appears to give much consideration to commentators
who have expressed their opinions on this subject. 4 7 As one commen-
tator has stated:
An alien unrepresented by counsel often will have a good reason
for not exhausting his remedies: in the absence of counsel, he
may fail to understand the implications of his decision not to
appeal. Furthermore, the technical failure to exhaust remedies
is not the reason the defendant is prosecuted under section 1326;
occurred may not be used to support a criminal conviction, and the dismissal of
the indictments against them was therefore proper.
Id at 842.
143. Id. at 839. The Court found it troubling that Respondents should be criminally
liable for illegal reentry based upon the results of an administrative deportation proceeding
in which their right of judicial review had been effectively denied. Id. at 838 n.15; see also
United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 179 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
144. 481 U.S. at 839. The Court stated, "Persons charged with [a] crime are entitled
to have the factual and legal determinations upon which convictions are based subjected to
the scrutiny of an impartial judicial officer." Id. at 841.
145. 343 U.S. at 179 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. 481 U.S. at 839 n.16.
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rather, the faults of the deportation hearing are what caused the
deportation order to be issued, and thus the alien should be
allowed to expose those faults by means of a collateral attack.148
Another commentator has stated: "To uphold the constitutionality of
section [1326] a court must recognize that Congress intended to require
a lawful deportation. Courts therefore should not only be permitted but
required to allow defendants to collaterally attack the deportation order
underlying their prosecution for illegal reentry."1 49
Rather than applying an objective screening of the ELT's conduct
during the deportation hearing as Justice Scalia does,"o° the majority
instead engages in a subjective analysis of the effects that the hearing
had on Respondents.151 For this reason it is difficult for the Court to
accept the distinction made by Justice Scalia in his dissent, wherein he
states: "There is a world of difference... between denial of a right to
appeal and failure to assure that parties understand the available grounds
for appeal and forgo them in a 'considered' fashion." 15 2 By focusing on
the inadequacies of the deportation hearing, the Court clearly finds
justification for reaching its decision. 53
Chief Justice Rehnquist raises a slightly different question in his
dissent where he downplays the injurious effects that the ILJ caused in
not elaborating on Respondents' eligibility for a suspension of their
deportations." 4  The Chief Justice correctly points out that suspension
of deportation is a discretionary measure,us however, he ignores the fact
148. Comment, CollateralAttack on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry,
48 U. CHI. L. REv. 83, 105 (1981).
149. Note, Collaterally Attacking Deportation Orders in Criminal Prosecutions for Illegal
Reentry Under Section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 56 NOTRE DAME
L. R. 677, 688 (1981); see also Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Spector.
The adjudication that an alien has been guilty of conduct subjecting him to
deportation is not made by procedures constitutional for judgment of crime. It
is not made either by a jury trial or a court decision. All that is required by
statute is a hearing before an administrative officer and that may be before one
who acts both as the alien's judge and prosecutor. The finding that the alien is
guilty of conduct subjecting him to deportation does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt but may be made by mere preponderance of evidence.
343 U.S. at 178 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
150. 481 U.S. at 848.
151. Id. at 840.
152. Id. at 849 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 839.
154. Id. at 843-44 (1987) (Rehnquist, Ch. J., dissenting).
155. Id.; see Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985)
(suspension of deportation denied where alien satisfied statutory continuous presence
requirement only by bringing meritless appeals in order to stall departure); Immigration &
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that once becoming aware of Respondents' eligibility to apply,'1' the ILJ
was thereafter dutybound to inquire into the aliens' backgrounds157
Because of the ILJ's failure to do so, the Court concludes that Respon-
dents were adversely prejudiced,158 and upholds the dismissal of their
indictments.59
IV. CONCLUSION
In Mendoza-Lopez, the United States Supreme Court limits its
holding to allow a collateral challenge to deportation orders only in those
cases where the result of a fundamentally unfair deportation hearing is
utilized in bringing a subsequent criminal prosecution under Section 1326
for illegal reentry. In the process, the Court wisely stops short of
eliciting any hard and fast standard or rule by which the lower courts are
bound in deciding whether or not a deportation hearing is fundamentally
unfair.160 Such matters are and should be settled by the lower courts,
which are better equipped to handle the type of evidentiary problems
posed.
At the same time, by wisely limiting its holding to Section 1326
prosecutions, the Court also succeeds in keeping the judicially economic
administrative process relatively intact. Those most affected by this
decision will probably be the IUs, who are seemingly put on notice to
ensure that every avenue of relief is completely and adequately explained
to aliens appearing before them in deportation proceedings, especially
those unrepresented by counsel. More importantly, the ILJ must also
ensure that such efforts at explanation are objectively reflected on the
Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1984) (eligibility for suspension
of deportation disqualified where alien's unexplained three-month absence from the United
States interrupted statutory seven-year continuous presence requirement); Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144-46 (1981) (suspension of
deportation denied to affluent and well-educated alien who failed to satisfy extreme hardship
requirement).
156. The ILJ in the present case was well aware that both Respondents had fulfilled the
statutory continuous presence requirements making them eligible to apply for a suspension
of their deportations. United States v. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, slip op. at 10-
11 (D. Neb. Feb. 28, 1985).
157. For the relevant portion of the federal regulation that imposes upon the IL_ the
duty to inform Respondents of their eligibility to apply for a suspension of their
deportations, see supra note 24; see also United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 222
(9th Cir. 1978) (IL] is required to inform an alien of his eligibility to apply for a suspension
of his deportation when information of alien's apparent eligibility is brought forth); Millan-
Garcia v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 343 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1965) (ILJ was
justified in not advising alien of eligibility for a suspension of his deportation when such
eligibility was not apparent).
158. 481 U.S. at 841-42. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 842.
160. Id. at 283 n.17.
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record in case of review by a higher court. Although this may place
more of a responsibility and burden on the ILJ, the benefit served will
far outweigh the administrative inconvenience, if any.
The Mendoza-Lopez decision also represents the Court's willingness
to look past both the literal interpretation of the law and blind ad-
herence to procedural prerequisites. It realistically recognizes that many
aliens undergoing deportation are neither wealthy enough to afford the
services of counsel nor sophisticated enough to understand the choices
they are being asked to make as well as the alternatives available to
them.161 The decision also accounts for the fundamental unfairness of the
imposition of a criminal sanction based upon an administrative ruling
devoid of the constitutional safeguards present in a criminal proceeding.
Beyond that, oftentimes the language barrier may act as a serious
impediment to a fair hearing, forming yet another obstacle for those
aliens unable to speak or understand English.
Finally, the decision is important on an international scale, albeit in
its own relatively small way. It conveys the message that one need not
be an American citizen to be treated equally under its laws. It is only
fitting that on the 200th anniversary of this nation's Constitution, a
nation founded by immigrants, that its highest Court would deliver a
decision so inherently rooted in that document's meaning and purpose.
William J. Larezza
161. See 107 CONG. Rac. 12,175, 12,178-81 (1961).
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